摘要： 长期以来，学界存在将司法审判等同于认识论事业的认知偏差，即过度强调事实认定的认识论属性，而忽视其作为制度性实践的本质特征。对此，应该从理论解构、核心内涵阐释、理论补充、商榷等维度予以回应。司法审判的核心使命是实现正义，其本质是一项以价值判断为先导、以程序规制为保障、以利益衡量为手段的制度性实践，属于“社会治理”范畴。事实认定的认识论活动仅是司法审判的环节之一，不构成司法审判的核心导向。司法认知与司法审判之间存在明确的间距和边界，将司法审判的认识论属性等同于它的本质属性属于认知偏差。在此基础上，应确立“以审判程序为中心，以证据为依据，以法律为准绳”的司法原则，为现代司法实践提供理论指引。

关键词: 司法认知, 司法审判, 制度性实践, 程序正义, 证据理论

Abstract: For a long time, academia has labored under a cognitive bias that equates judicial adjudication with an epistemological undertaking—overemphasizing the epistemological attributes of fact—finding while neglecting the essential character of judicial adjudication as an institutional practice. It argues, from the dimensions of theoretical deconstruction, interpretation of core connotations, theoretical supplementation, and scholarly engagement, that the core mission of judicial adjudication is the realization of justice. Its essence is an institutional practice guided by value judgment, safeguarded by procedural regulation, and conducted through interest balancing, falling within the domain of social governance. The epistemological activity of fact-finding constitutes only one component of judicial adjudication. It does not determine the core orientation of judicial adjudication. A clear boundary exists between judicial cognition and judicial adjudication; equating the epistemological attributes of judicial adjudication with its essential attributes is a cognitive error. On this basis, the judicial principle of “taking trial procedures as the center, evidence as the basis, and law as the criterion” should be established, offering a robust theoretical guide for modern judicial practice.

Key words: judicial cognition, judicial adjudication, institutional practice, procedural justice, evidence theory